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THE HARM TO STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN
SCHOOL BOARDS MAKE CURRICULAR DECISIONS IN
RESPONSE TO POLITICAL PRESSURE: A CRITIQUE OF
GRISWOLD V. DRISCOLL
Jason Persinger*

I. INTRODUCTION
The rights afforded to American citizens by the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution form some of the bedrock principles of this
country. Not only are citizens free from government restriction of their
speech, but they are also given the opportunity to access and receive
other types of speech at will. While many people instantly identify the
First Amendment with the freedom to speak, the opportunity to find and
become exposed to the speech of others is fundamental to free speech
rights.
One area where the extent of our First Amendment rights is not
entirely clear is in the context of the public education system. A number
of cases have been adjudicated in an attempt to establish the proper role
of speech, assembly, religious exercise, and religious establishment
inside a school. In one particular subset of cases deciding school
boards’ discretion in setting a curriculum, the issue of receiving and
accessing particular speech has been discussed. In these cases, courts
look at the authority that schools have in determining the curriculum for
students, including their rights to establish acceptable reading materials
and online resources.
When it comes to a school’s curriculum, the main controversy stems
from a school board’s decision to include or exclude a certain resource
that students may access. This inclusion or exclusion has prompted
parents, teachers, and students to initiate litigation against school boards,
claiming that the actions of the school board violated the First
Amendment rights of students. While courts generally give schools full
discretion to organize a curriculum for the students,1 the Supreme Court
has stated that ―[t]eachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank his family for their love and support.
1. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.‖2
Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Griswold v. Driscoll,
settled a dispute in which the Massachusetts State Board of Education
removed materials from its curricular guide in response to political
pressure over certain resources included in the guide.3 While some
students, parents, teachers and a local cultural group accused the board
of violating the First Amendment rights of students to access the deleted
materials, the court held that the school board’s decision was
permissible and did not violate the First Amendment.4 Using Supreme
Court case law, the court decided that state and local authorities have
great discretion in setting curriculums, that state and local authorities
have the important task of preparing students for life after school, and
that the government, as a speaker, may advance a viewpoint if it wants.5
However, the decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals ignored
an important aspect of school curriculum case law. Many courts have
explicitly stated that school boards may not approach their curriculums
in a partisan or political manner. The Griswold court incorrectly
ignored this general rule in its decision.
This Casenote explores Griswold v. Driscoll and the limitations
placed upon school boards by other courts when school boards restrict
curricular materials available to students for political reasons. Part II
analyzes previous First Amendment cases involving students to develop
a general rule regarding how a school may regulate its curriculum. Part
III discusses the facts of Griswold v. Driscoll and the decision of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in finding for the Massachusetts Board of
Education. Part IV reconciles the Griswold decision with the prior First
Amendment cases involving students by discussing the ways in which
the First Circuit Court of Appeals should have looked at the situation to
protect the First Amendment rights of the students. Finally, Part V
argues for courts to use a different approach from the one implemented
in the Griswold in deciding future curriculum cases.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1006 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
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II. PRIOR CASES
Part II of this Casenote discusses cases that have addressed a school
board’s discretion to set its curriculum and how far that discretion can
be exercised before the school board infringes on a student’s First
Amendment rights. Subpart A discusses how a federal district court in
Massachusetts and the United States Supreme Court addressed the
removal of materials from school libraries. Next, subpart A analyzes
school curriculum cases from federal district and appellate courts.
Subpart B explores the permissibility of indoctrination of particular
beliefs on students. Subpart C addresses the need for schools to have a
compelling governmental interest to interfere with a student’s right to
receive information. Subpart D analyzes cases that have defined
compelling governmental interest in the context of school curriculums.
Subpart E looks at a case where a student tried to compel a school to
include a particular book on the school’s curriculum. Finally, subpart F
lays out the common themes that have emerged in the federal courts in
regards to a school board’s power in creating its curriculum.
While the Supreme Court has not directly decided the extent of a
school board’s power in setting its curriculum, the Court has mentioned
a general proposition for the proper role of schools. In dicta, the
Supreme Court has stated that great discretion is afforded to schools and
local authorities in deciding what students should study to better prepare
the students for the real world.6 However, over the years, federal courts
have eroded that view and held that students have broader rights to
exercise their First Amendment freedoms. Many courts have found that
students have a constitutional right to access information, and therefore
a school must have a compelling reason to deprive students of that
right.7
The discussion of these cases highlights two general propositions of
law. First, a school board has substantial discretion to create a
curriculum and allow access to curricular and library materials. Second,
students have a First Amendment right in accessing and exploring
information—a right that the government cannot limit without a

6. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion).
7. Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1982).
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compelling governmental interest. In regards to the second proposition,
courts have explicitly stated that pressure placed on the school board to
conform to certain political beliefs does not constitute a compelling
government interest.
A. The Right to be Exposed to Controversial Ideas and Ideas Contrary
to the School Board’s Prescribed Orthodoxy—Libraries
Before delving into cases involving school curriculums, an important
precursor set of cases involving the removal of materials from school
libraries helps underscore this framework. In Right to Read Defense
Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee of the City of Chelsea, the
District Court of Massachusetts held that the desire to eliminate
controversial materials from a library did not further a substantial
governmental interest and thus infringed on the First Amendment rights
of students.8 This case involved the Chelsea School Committee’s
decision to remove an anthology of student poems from the school
library after a parent objected to the content in the anthology as
offensive and vile.9
The court reviewed the First Amendment rights afforded to students
in school. While acknowledging that schools have the ability to choose
what materials are accessible to students and that the school was under
no obligation to purchase the anthology initially, the court held that the
decision to purchase the anthology created a constitutionally protected
interest for students to access the materials.10 To override this interest,
the school had to show that the decision to eliminate the anthology did
not come from the discomfort and unpleasantness that accompanied
unpopular speech in the poems.11
The court held that the school decided to remove the anthology
simply because the school found the materials unacceptable.12 Finding
support from a Supreme Court decision, which states ―students may not
be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Right to Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 712–13.
Id. at 713.
Id.
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chooses to communicate,‖ the court overturned the removal of the
anthology.13 The importance of students exercising free will in
accessing information was considered more important than the
objections community members had over the information available to
students.
The Supreme Court took a stance similar to that of the Massachusetts
district court soon after the Right to Read decision.14 In Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that school boards may not remove
books from a school library just because the school board dislikes the
ideas contained in the books.15
In Pico, a local school board told school libraries to remove books
that were featured on a list of objectionable books.16 The board
characterized the objectionable books as anti-American and antiChristian, and justified its decision by saying that it had a duty to protect
children from the moral danger found in the books.17
The Court noted that school boards have the discretion to allow
students to access school materials but stated that the discretion must be
exercised in a way that comports with the constitutional rights of those
students.18 In cases where the actions of school boards infringe on
students’ constitutional rights, courts may step in to resolve any
disputes.19 Finding that the actions of the school board involved the
students’ ability to access information as an exercise of their rights of
speech, press, and political freedom, the Court decided to intervene.20
The Court held that while the school board in Pico had discretion to
regulate the contents of its libraries, it could not exercise that discretion
in a narrowly partisan or political way. 21 By denying students the
opportunity to access ideas the school board disagreed with, the board

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 715.
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 857–858.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 867–69.
Id. at 870.
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was casting a ―pall of orthodoxy‖ over students that would result in an
official suppression of ideas.22 The Court felt that for students to learn
how to exercise their First Amendment rights in a meaningful manner,
they should be able to access ideas that are unpopular to others.23
In dicta, the Pico Court stated that a school board could claim that its
duty to impart community values to students would allow it to possess
absolute discretion in developing its curriculum.24 However, this
statement garnered only a plurality of the Court and was not relevant to
the issues at hand. The only rule expressed in Pico was that a school
board may not exercise its discretion in a political or partisan manner
such that its actions result in a suppression of accessible ideas for
students.25
While these two cases did not directly address school curriculums,
they put forth rules that would be adopted in school curriculum cases by
many federal courts. Right to Read and Pico laid down the framework
in interpreting the First Amendment as granting in students the right to
access information—a right that would extend from library materials to
school curriculums. These cases also expressed the belief that students
should not be indoctrinated by the prescribed beliefs of the school board
but rather be free to access other points of view.
B. Absence of Indoctrination of Particular Beliefs—Curriculum
Around the time that Right to Read and Pico were being decided,
federal courts started to address the limits of a school board’s power in
setting its curriculum. In 1980, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
heard a case where two high school students claimed that their First
Amendment rights were violated by a school board’s decision to remove
certain courses and books from the school curriculum.26 In Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corporation, the students alleged that the
actions of the school board were not in furtherance of a legitimate
educational interest but were taken because the board’s social, political,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.
Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
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and moral tastes were offended by the content of the books.27 However,
the school argued that it was acting under a policy that prohibited
reading materials that ―might be objectionable‖ and decided that the
banned materials violated that policy.28
In deciding the scope of the students’ First Amendment rights, the
court found that the students were unable to sustain their constitutional
claims. The court reasoned that while it is important for academic
communities to be free from ideological coercion, a student’s right to
academic freedom is second to the school’s role in aiding a student’s
academic development.29 This academic development is the primary
function of schools, and schools must be able to exercise that role as
fully as possible.30 In this situation, the local school board had the
authority to make educational decisions based on its particular views as
long as it acted within school board policy.
The court decided that it was improper for courts to step in and act
when a school models its curriculum in a way it believes best aids the
intellectual development of its students.31 However, the court noted that
if a school board decided to expose students to rigid and exclusive
indoctrination as an extension of its own beliefs, it would be permissible
for a court to step in to resolve disputes that emerge.32
C. Need for Substantial Governmental Interest to Interfere With
Students Right to Receive Information
Two years after Zykan was decided came a decision from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals that weakened the authority of school boards to
shape their curriculums when they lack a substantial governmental
interest. In Pratt v. Independent School District No. 831, junior and
senior high school students brought a lawsuit against their school district

27. Id.
28. Id. at 1302.
29. Id. at 1305.
30. Id. at 1304.
31. Id. at 1305.
32. Id. at 1306 (―But nothing in the Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local
educational discretion until local authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclusive indoctrination for the
mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic choices regarding matters of legitimate dispute.‖).
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to compel the district to allow the showing of the film The Lottery.33
The plot of The Lottery revolved around a community that held a lottery
each year to select a person to be stoned to death.34 The school banned
the film after succumbing to political pressure from parents and
community members who claimed that the film was too violent and
impacted the religious and family values of the students. 35
The district court found that the board banned the film because of its
ideological content.36 Based on that finding, it held that the students’
First Amendment rights were violated and that the film should be
restored to its previous place in the school curriculum.37
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court.38 Acknowledging that state and local authorities control
public education and that school boards are allowed substantial
deference in establishing their curriculums, the court conceded that
decisions regarding a school’s curriculum may take a community values
into account.39 However, the court felt this case was similar to the
results in Zykan and Pico and held that local authorities could not
impose a ―pall of orthodoxy‖ on students by subjecting them to a certain
ideological viewpoint while suppressing their right to explore other
viewpoints.40
Stemming from deliberation on these two concerns, the court held
that for the school board to lawfully ban the material from its
curriculum, it must establish that ―a substantial and reasonable
governmental interest existed for interfering with the students’ right to
receive information.‖41 Finding that the school board did not undertake
a systematic review of violence and only banned the film in response to
political pressure from the community, the court held that the school

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 773.
Id.
Id.
Pratt, 670 F.2d at 775.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
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board unconstitutionally removed the film from the school curriculum.42
The court reasoned that this case involved the rights of students to
receive information and access controversial ideas—rights that are
fundamental to the First Amendment.43 Since political pressure from the
community did not constitute a legitimate interest to interfere with the
students’ right to receive information, the school was not allowed to ban
the film.44
D. Defining Substantial and Reasonable Governmental Interest
While the Pratt court held that a school board had to show a
substantial and reasonable governmental interest in removing materials
from its curriculum, it left unanswered the question of what constituted a
substantial and reasonable governmental interest. In Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court tried to define this phrase.45 The Court,
in holding that a school’s decision to delete pages from a schoolsponsored student newspaper was permissible, stated that a school may
censor various forms of speech at school in furtherance of a legitimate
pedagogical concern.46
In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Hazelwood standard to a school’s regulation of its curriculum. In Virgil
v. School Board of Columbia County, Florida, the court looked into the
constitutionality of a school board’s decision to eliminate textbooks that
featured vulgarity and sexuality from its curriculum.47 Parents of
students in the school district filed suit claiming that the elimination of
the textbooks violated their children’s First Amendment rights.48
The court looked at two factors in determining this case. First,
applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bethel School District v. Fraser,
42. Id. at 778–779.
43. Id. at 779.
44. Id. at 778–779.
45. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
46. Id. at 273. In Hazelwood, a school deleted pages from the school newspaper that referred to
students who were pregnant. Id. The Supreme Court held that this was permissible because the school
was acting in a manner to maintain the privacy concerns of students. Id. This, the Court felt, was a
legitimate pedagogical concern. Id.
47. Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
48. Id.
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the Virgil court held that a school could consider the emotional maturity
of students in determining whether to expose students to controversial
topics, i.e., sex.49 Second, the Virgil court applied the Hazelwood
standard, stating that the school board’s motivation in removing the
textbooks must be related to a legitimate pedagogical concern, which in
this case was preventing exposure to sexuality and vulgarity at school.50
Acknowledging that the motivation of the board was based on the sexual
and vulgar content of the books and not on any particular community
ideological or political beliefs,51 the court held that the board’s actions
were constitutional. Other circuits have utilized the Hazelwood analysis
in assessing the legality of a school board’s alteration of its
curriculum.52
E. Students May Not Compel School To Provide Access to Any
Information Desired
A more recent case, from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
discarded the Hazelwood analysis in deciding the constitutionality of a
school board’s discretion in setting its curriculum. Chiras v. Miller
involved the refusal of the Texas State Board of Education to place a
certain environmental book on a list of recommended books for schools
to include in their curriculums.53 A student brought a claim against the
board, alleging that it interfered with his right to receive the
information.54 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first decided that
recent Supreme Court decisions had broadened the power of a school
board to create its curriculum, stating that when a school chooses among
private speakers to facilitate its message, its decision is not subject to
49. Id. at 1521. The Virgil court drew guidance from the 1986 Supreme Court decision Bethel
School District v. Fraser. Id. In Fraser, a student nominated a fellow student for school-elected office.
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). During the speech, the student referred to the
candidate with a graphic, explicit sexual metaphor. Id. at 678. As a result, the student was suspended
from school. Id. The Supreme Court found that the school did have an interest in protecting minors
from sexually explicit language. Id. at 685.
50. Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1522–23.
51. Id. at 1523.
52. See Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 100–101 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
53. Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005).
54. Id.
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forum or viewpoint analysis.55 As the Hazelwood test presumed a forum
open to others, which the court said was not present in this case, the
court declined to apply that test.56
The court further held that a student does not have a right to compel
schools to allow access to every resource that the student desires.57
Therefore, it was permissible for the Texas Education Board to ignore
the student’s request to include a particular environmental book in the
curriculum.58 However, the court did mention the Supreme Court’s
language in Pico that said schools may not exercise their discretion in a
narrowly partisan or political way.59 The Chiras court declined to
follow Pico because there was no evidence to show that the education
board’s refusal to place a particular environmental book on a list of
recommended curricular materials was motivated by partisan or political
feelings.60 This implies that in instances where a school board chooses
to include certain materials in a curriculum based on the board’s
political ideology, the board’s actions would be unacceptable.
F. Common Themes
Looking at these cases together, some common themes emerge. First,
the federal courts are in agreement that school boards are afforded
significant discretion in setting their curriculums. Second, the federal
courts have balanced the discretion of schools boards with the interest of
55. Id. at 615. The Chiras court distinguished this case from the Supreme Court case
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia. In that case, the Supreme Court said that
schools have broad discretion when making funding decisions regarding their curriculum. Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). However, the Rosenberger Court said
that once the school allows a fund for student publications, this created a forum that was subject to a
viewpoint-neutral restriction process. Id. at 829–830. Chiras held that the school board did not create a
forum for expression of various authors of textbooks, instead leaving the choice of textbooks to the
discretion of board members. Chiras, 432 F.3d at 615.
56. Chiras, 432 F.3d at 616. The Chiras court said that to apply Hazelwood, it would have to
find that the Texas Board of Education created a right to access its recommended textbook list in others.
Id. The court instead found that the Board of Education was transmitting its own message by making a
list of textbooks it thought was appropriate for schools to use in school. Id.
57. Id. at 620.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 619.
60. Id. at 619–20.
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students in maintaining their First Amendment rights by holding that
curricular decisions must not infringe on the rights of students to access
and receive information. Third, as long as a restriction of access to
information furthers a substantial governmental interest, the restriction
will likely be upheld. However, a substantial governmental interest may
not include a school board’s partisan and political ideology. Finally, the
right of students to access information is not absolute and students do
not have the right to compel schools to make available any information
the students desire.
III. GRISWOLD V. DRISCOLL
In 2010, the First Circuit Court of Appeals continued the analysis of
how a school board may exercise its curricular discretion without
infringing on the First Amendment rights of students. In Griswold v.
Driscoll, the First Circuit looked at a case where the Massachusetts State
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education added materials to a
curricular guide but then subsequently removed the materials in
response to political pressure from groups of parents and citizens of the
state.61 In this case, the court took an approach different from the
approaches of other circuits and district courts in settling school
curriculum disputes.
A. Facts
In Massachusetts, the state education board was required to formulate
recommendations to schools on curricular materials related to genocide
and human rights.62 The board listed the Armenian genocide as a
possible topic of instruction and included a number of relevant resources
for teachers to use in the classroom.63 The material on the Armenian
genocide also included brief background information, which stated,
―Muslim Turkish Ottoman Empire destroyed large portions of its
Christian Armenian minority population.‖64
61.
62.
63.
64.

Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/8

12

Persinger: THE HARM TO STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN SCHOOL BOARDS MAK

2011]

CASENOTE—STUDENT’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

303

In response to this recommendation, a local Turkish cultural group
objected and asked the board to revise the materials to reflect a more
―objective study of history.‖65 In particular, the group requested that the
board include resources depicting the ―contra-genocide perspective,‖ a
perspective arguing that the policy of the Ottoman Turks during that
period was not a policy of genocide.66 After hearing this request from
the Turkish group, the board revised the curricular guide, adding sources
in support of the contra-genocide perspective and removing the
background information section.67 The revisions were submitted to
legislative officials for approval after they were adopted by the board.68
The revisions upset Armenian descendants residing in Massachusetts.
In response, a group of Armenians sent a letter of complaint to the
governor, asking for the removal of the contra-genocide sources from
the curricular guide.69 As a result, the curricular guide was revised
again. With the exception of the Website of the Turkish embassy, all of
the pro-Turkish sources were deleted.70 After the local Turkish group
complained about the removal of the contra-genocide information, the
board replied that the purpose of the guide was to address the genocide,
not debate whether or not it occurred.71 The board continued by saying
that the guide could not refer to any source that questioned the
authenticity of the genocide.72 The board also explicitly stated that the
genocide and the human rights section of the curriculum should be
based on factual information ―aligned with the material in the
Massachusetts Curriculum Framework.‖73
Students, parents, teachers, and a group of Turkish-Americans
subsequently filed suit against the Massachusetts Board of Education
and some of its individual officers for making these changes. 74 The

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 55.
Griswold, 616 F.3d at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Griswold, 616 F.3d at 55.
Id.
Id.
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lawsuit alleged that the removal of pro-Turkish sources was viewpointbased discrimination and infringed on free speech rights in violation of
the First Amendment.75 After the district court granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss,76 the First Circuit Court of Appeals heard the
appeal.
B. The Guide Is Not Analogous To Library Materials
There were two possible classifications for the curricular guide—it
could be seen as a virtual school library established for the benefit of
both students and teachers or as an important element of the curriculum
itself.77 There were two arguments made for treating the guide like
library materials. First, the guide was made available to students to
view at will, like materials in a library.78 Second, there was a failure in
the guide to ―claim consistently that it occupies the entire field of
legitimate source material.‖79
Responding to these arguments, the court first concluded that the
ability to view the guide was not, by itself, sufficient to transform a
curriculum guide into a virtual library.80 The state board was using the
guide to provide a framework for instruction and placed it on the state
board Website, along with all other curricular frameworks developed by
the state.81 It was only to be used as a supplement for teachers to steer
the direction of classroom discussions.82
Turning to the second argument—that there was a question as to
whether the curricular guide constituted the entire scope of legitimate
source material on genocide—the court took the position that the guide
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id.
77. Id. Different standards of review are applied if the curricular guide is deemed library
materials and not curricular. Id. The Griswold court noted that if the guide was considered library
materials, it would apply the Pico decision to resolve the dispute. Id. at 57.
78. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 59.
79. Id. This argument refers to the ability of teachers to inquire into other information in teaching
the genocide materials. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that this was the function of a library, open inquiry
and searching into materials. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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appeared to be open-ended.83 Said another way, the guide allowed
teachers to look beyond the parameters set by the Massachusetts Board
of Education.84 Since the guide allowed teachers to further explore the
topics beyond the information that was provided, the court believed that
it was not similar to a library where people are limited to the books in
the system.85 Therefore, the court dismissed the comparisons of the
curricular guide to a virtual library and held that it instead more closely
resembled a school curriculum.86
C. Treating the Guide as Part of the Curriculum
After finding that the state board guide was closely related to a
school’s curriculum, the court looked to past Supreme Court decisions
to discern the scope of a school board’s curricular discretion. The
Griswold court was guided by the plurality opinion in Pico and its
statement that a school board may have absolute immunity in matters of
curriculum.87 Building upon this statement, the court discussed three
strands of Supreme Court case law to set forth the view that school
board’s may exercise autonomy in curricular decisions.
The first strand of case law stresses the importance of public schools
in the academic and emotional development of students. These
Supreme Court cases held that the role of public schools is to prepare
students for being citizens and to teach students the values our society
holds dear.88 The second strand deals with the lengths at which a public
school may exercise its power within the scope of academic

83. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 59.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 58.
88. Id. The Griswold court used two Supreme Court cases, Ambach v. Norwick and Bethel
School District v. Fraser to illustrate this point. Id. The Fraser case was previously discussed in
endnote 42, with the Court deciding that a school could suspend a student for exposing other students to
sexually explicit remarks. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Ambach, the Supreme
Court discusses the proper role of public education. Id. The Court said that ―importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.‖ Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
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development. The Supreme Court has afforded state and local school
boards considerable discretion in operating schools free from judicial
interference. The general rule of the Supreme Court is that the judiciary
may not interfere with curricular decisions unless basic constitutional
values are implicated by the actions of a school board.89 The third
strand of case law regards the government as speaker. The Supreme
Court has given the government authority to choose its own viewpoints
when it is speaking.90
The Griswold court found that these three strands pointed to adopting
the language in Pico regarding absolute discretion over curricular
matters being given to school boards.91 The court held that the State
Board of Education had the authority to set its curriculum, and therefore
the actions taken by the board were legal and did not implicate the First
Amendment rights of students.92 The Griswold court concluded that this
outcome was proper even if the revisions to the curriculum were ―made
in response to political pressure.‖93
IV. DISCUSSION
In conceding that the court would reach the same decision even if the
school changed its curriculum in response to political pressure, the
Griswold court ignored several contrary court cases. Even worse, the

89. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 58. The Griswold court used the Supreme Court cases Edwards v.
Aguillard and Epperson v. Arkansas to show this strand. Id. In Edwards, a challenge was brought
questioning the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which forbade the teaching of evolution. Id. The
Court struck down the statute, though made clear to note that ―states and local school boards are
generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools.‖ Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 583 (1987). In Epperson, the Court once again struck down an anti-evolution, this time in
Arkansas. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Before addressing the issue, the Court noted
that while it is desirable for judicial restraint in the day-to-day operations of schools, it is proper for
courts to intervene when students’ basic constitutional values are implicated. Id.
90. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 58–59. The Griswold court looked at the 2009 case Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum to show this strand. Id. In Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court looked at whether
the government had to place a monument depicting the Ten Commandments in a public park. Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). The Court held that this was an example of government
speech, and that it was not subject to the constraints imposed by the First Amendment. Id.
91. Griswold, 616 F.3d at 59.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 60.
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Griswold court’s one sentence statement shows that it did not seriously
consider the implications of condoning school boards that make
curricular decisions based on political preferences. While the Griswold
court did follow Chiras in stating that schools do not have to allow
access to every resource students desire,94 the Chiras court expressed a
belief that a school acting in a partisan or political manner may be acting
unconstitutionally.95
By reaching this conclusion, the Griswold court has distanced itself
from its sister circuits. Part of the reason for the difference is because
the Griswold court did not find a constitutionally protected right to
inquire into and access information vested to the students.96 Unlike
Griswold, other federal courts,97 including the Supreme Court,98 have
recognized and protected this right.
In this Part, the Griswold case is compared to the holdings and
principles developed in prior cases. Subpart A analyzes whether the
students had a constitutionally protected right in accessing the contragenocide materials. Subpart B discusses the political pressure that
resulted in the elimination of the contra-genocide materials from the
Massachusetts guide and how the Griswold decision differs from other
courts in allowing the elimination to stand. Subpart C looks at the harm
in refusing to expose students to unpopular ideas. Subpart C also
discusses the harm in forcing students to follow a prescribed set of
thinking. Subpart D explores the possible harm in allowing the judiciary
to impose its will over school boards.
A. Creating a Constitutionally Protected Right in the Prohibited
Material
Before addressing the legality of removing materials from a
curriculum because of political pressure, courts must find a
constitutionally protected right to access the materials. Almost every
94. Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 620 (5th Cir. 2005).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 58.
97. Right to Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978); Pratt v.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982).
98. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982).
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federal court that has addressed school board curricular discretion has
noted that courts may not intervene in any conflict in which a
constitutional right is not at issue.99
To reiterate, school boards are not required to acquiesce to every
request for information a student or teacher might have.100 In other
words, students and teachers do not have a constitutionally protected
right to demand that a particular subject is taught or is made accessible
within the school. In Zykan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that any right a student had to academic independence was superseded
by the school’s role in academic development.101 In Chiras, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided a student may not require a school to
provide every single resource that a student might desire.102
However, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have held that
the First Amendment grants students the right to inquire into and access
information. In Pico, the Supreme Court found a constitutional right to
receive information as an exercise of the First Amendment. It therefore
held that a school could not eliminate materials from a school library.103
In Pratt, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a student has the
First Amendment right to be exposed to controversial ideas and not to be
limited to exposure of only one viewpoint.104 In Cary v. Board of
Education of the Adamsarapahoe School District, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found a right for teachers to use non-obscene materials
to instruct students in elective courses.105
Granted, neither Pico nor the cases from other circuits are binding
precedent on the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the
Griswold court was not under an obligation to follow these cases to find
a constitutionally protected right for students to access and receive the
requested information. However, the trend of these other circuits, as
99. Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 711; Pratt, 670 F.2d at 775; Pico, 457 U.S. at 866.
100. Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 620 (5th Cir. 2005).
101. Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980).
102. Chiras, 432 F.3d at 620.
103. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867–69.
104. Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982).
105. In a case where high school teachers brought a lawsuit against a school board after the school
board banned ten books from elective classes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the banning
was constitutional because there was no systemic effort made to ―exclude any particular type of thinking
or book.‖ Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
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well as the Supreme Court, shows that courts in the United States have
found that the right to receive and access information is present in the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In addition to the right to receive and access information, some courts
have stated that the affirmative actions of authority figures can vest
certain people with constitutionally protected rights. Some courts have
held that a state may create a constitutionally protected interest as a
consequence of taking an action when not compelled.106 A specific
constitutional interest in the First Amendment that the Supreme Court
has found generally is for ―the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences.‖107
The important question to ask in this situation is whether the
placement of the contra-genocide materials in a draft of the
Massachusetts Board of Education curricular guide vested in the
students the right to access this information. One argument that the
school made was that the disputed curricular guide was only a draft, and
there was nothing official about an inclusion of the contra-genocide
material.
Conversely, it is clear for a period of time that the contra-genocide
materials were included in the guide. During this time, Driscoll, the
board’s commissioner, believed the materials were suitable for the
guide.108 By all appearances, the guide including the contra-genocide
materials would have been approved but for the opposition of the
Armenian groups.109 This shows that if there was never any political
pressure placed on Driscoll to eliminate the contra-genocide materials,
the students would have been able to access the information. The initial
opportunity to access the information would vest in students their First
Amendment rights to be exposed to the materials. Placing the contra106. Right to Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712–13 (D. Mass. 1978).
107. Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
108. Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2010). Note 3, supra, mentions that it is
possible that Driscoll added in the materials referencing the contra-genocide perspective without board
approval and submitted them to the legislative body. Id. Regardless of what the actual facts are,
Driscoll still took the affirmative action of including the materials on the curricular guide. Id. If the
materials were offensive to him or students, Driscoll would never have given them the initial approval to
submit to the legislature. Id. at 55, n. 2.
109. Id. at 55.
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genocide materials on the guide, even for a limited time, shows
Driscoll’s intent in allowing students the opportunity to access and
receive that information.
Whether it is the inherent right to access information or the vested
right the students received when the contra-genocide materials were
placed on the curricular guide, the Griswold court should have found
that the students had a First Amendment right in accessing the contragenocide materials.
B. The Political Decision to Remove the Contra-Genocide Materials
Finding a right in accessing the contra-genocide materials, the next
factor to look at is the rationale behind the deletion of the materials.
From the facts of Griswold, it appears that the decision to remove the
contra-genocide materials was based on political pressure.110 Many
courts have found that a school board’s decision to exercise its power
based on political reasons violates students’ First Amendment rights.
In Pico, the Supreme Court held that students should be free to
receive information as part of the exercise of their First Amendment
right of political freedom.111 The Court also ruled that school boards
may not restrict access to library materials in a partisan or political
manner.112 The Pratt court took the view that shaping a curriculum in
response to pressure from the community unlawfully infringed on
students’ First Amendment rights.113 The Virgil court also used this
reasoning to hold that a decision to remove materials because of the
material’s contents was constitutional specifically because it was not
made due to political pressure.114 Finally, the Chiras court took note of
these cases, stating that if a school board decided not to purchase certain
materials because of political or partisan beliefs, the actions of the

110. While the Griswold court tries to minimize the impact of the political pressure, Driscoll
intended to submit the guide containing contra-genocide materials to legislative officials. Griswold, 616
F.3d at 55. However, after Armenian groups and others wrote letters to the governor, the contragenocide materials were removed. Id.
111. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
112. Id. at 869.
113. Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 778–79 (8th Cir. 1982).
114. Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989).
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school board would be unconstitutional.115
As mentioned previously, some courts have allowed school boards to
infringe on the First Amendment right of students to access information
if the schools base their decisions on a compelling governmental
interest. The Hazelwood court held that this interest had to be related to
a legitimate pedagogical concern.116
The question then becomes, what constitutes a legitimate pedagogical
concern? In Hazelwood, the concern was protecting the privacy of
students. In other contexts, the concern has been exposure to obscenity,
sexuality, and violent content.117 The Massachusetts education board in
Griswold never gave a legitimate reason for its decision to eliminate
contra-genocide materials from its guide. The commissioner stated only
that the guide should not include information that caused disputes and
that the board had the discretion to make that decision.118
Looking at the facts in Griswold, it is evident that the decision by
Driscoll to remove the contra-genocide materials before submission to
the board was based on political pressure. It was not until the group of
Armenians protested that Driscoll even considered removing the
materials from the guide.119
The reasons given for the removal did not have anything to do with
obscenity, violence, sexuality, or vulgarity. Instead, the board removed
the materials because of political pressure. The ideas expressed in those
contra-genocide materials were unpopular, and even though the ideas
were premised on a multitude of research, Driscoll still felt the matter of
the genocide was settled.120
In Griswold, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that even if a
school board made a decision to excise materials from its curriculum
based on political pressure, the board would not be acting outside of its
afforded power.121 This dismisses the notion that a student’s First

115. Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d. 606, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2005).
116. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
117. See, e.g., Pratt, 670 F.2d 771; Virgil, 862 F.2d 1517; Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2010).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 55.
121. Id. at 60.
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Amendment rights can be violated when a school restricts access to
information as a result of political pressure—a view that runs counter to
other courts that have looked at this issue. Therefore, to afford the same
First Amendment protection to students that many other federal courts
have afforded, the Griswold court should have taken more notice of
these cases in looking at the decision of the state board to eliminate the
contra-genocide materials.
C. The Harm in Eliminating Exposure to Unpopular Information
By allowing the Massachusetts Board of Education to succumb to
political pressure and eliminate controversial materials from the
curricular guide, the Griswold court ignored the essential functions of
the First Amendment. One of the principles this country holds dear is
the opportunity to express and receive information regardless of how
unpopular it may be. This principle has allowed a group to stage a Nazi
march through a predominately Jewish community.122 This principle
has also allowed the publisher of a pornographic magazine to publish
jokes about a Reverend having incestuous relationships with his
mother.123 It can be argued that those two situations were in poor taste
and were offensive. However, that is a trade-off we accept in our
society, which takes pride in our constitutional freedoms.124
The unpopular materials in Griswold were not vulgar or obscene.
This differs from the materials in Zykan, which the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held could be eliminated from a school’s curriculum
because they violated statutory constraints on objectionable material
developed by the school board.125 The unpopular materials in Griswold
were not violent or gruesome. Following the Pratt ruling, where the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held banned materials were not violent

122. Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
123. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
124. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–746 (1978) (―[T]he fact that society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.‖).
125. Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
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and should be restored to the curriculum,126 the Griswold court should
have employed the same logic. The unpopular materials in Griswold
were also not sexual. This differs from the Virgil case, in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the elimination of school
materials because the school board found the materials to be
objectionable in their sexual nature.127
The unpopular materials in Griswold dealt solely with the factual
accuracy of events during a certain time period. Opposing sides often
disagree about the actual course of history. In our scholastic world, the
most persuasive evidence will prevail. In the court of public opinion,
people can take evidence supporting each side and choose to believe the
side with more convincing evidence.
Students are disadvantaged when they are not given the opportunity
to hear opinions that are unpopular. They do not get to balance
opposing sides, consider the evidence and analysis of the facts, and
determine which opinion is correct. Without these opportunities,
students are not as prepared for the real world as they could be.128
D. The Harm of Limiting a Student’s Exposure to Only SchoolSanctioned Material
Allowing students to be exposed only to school-sanctioned messages
is as harmful as limiting a student’s exposure to unpopular materials. A
concept that courts have adopted is that schools are not allowed to cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.129 While schools are generally
allowed to decide what a student should study, schools cannot prescribe
a particular political, national, religious, or cultural belief on students.130
The Massachusetts Board of Education has done precisely that by
126. Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 778–79 (8th Cir. 1982).
127. Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989).
128. In Pico, the Court says that public schools are vital in preparing individuals to participate as
citizens in the real world. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982). The Pico Court continued
by saying that the right to receive others’ ideas is necessary to the recipient’s exercise of his own First
Amendment rights. Id. at 867. It follows that if public schools prepare students to act in the real world,
and part of that acting is the exercise of First Amendment rights, limiting a student’s access to
information hinders the student’s ability to exercise those rights in the real world.
129. Id. at 870.
130. Id.
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succumbing to political pressure and eliminating its Website materials
referencing the Armenian genocide contra-genocide viewpoint.
By acting in this manner, the state is not creating independent
thinkers. One of the key tools needed to survive in our society is the
ability to research, comprehend, and analyze various issues surrounding
us. In almost all instances, a unanimous opinion over a particular issue
does not exist. Take, for example, elections. Rarely does an important
election come down to only one possible candidate. Elections feature
multiple candidates with differing views on how to run a government.
To make an informed decision, our electorate needs to be able to look at
the positions of the candidates and decide which candidate is best suited
for the area to be represented.131
Exposing students to only one prescribed school of thought hinders
their abilities to function efficiently in the real world. Teaching students
to look at multiple sides of an issue is one of the most important ways to
make them efficient thinkers. This prevents students from being
puppets of the school or from being forced to say and think only what
the school believes. In the real world, students have to think for
themselves. It is best to let them practice within the confines of a
school.132
E. The Harm of Judicially Mandated School Curriculums
The strongest argument against allowing courts to intervene in cases
such as Griswold is that courts become the ultimate decision-maker of
what students should learn.133 Local decisions are often best decided by
131. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Democracy depends on a well-informed
electorate, not a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues.
Id. at 49, n. 55.
132. In the Supreme Court case Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court warned against schools
creating a ―pall of orthodoxy‖ in the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
In essence, the Court said that authoritative selection of acceptable viewpoints in school does not
prepare students for life after school. Id. The Court further stated that ―[t]he Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of
a multitude of tongues . . . .‖ Id.
133. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that ―Judicial interposition in the
operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.‖).
However, the Court continued by saying that while courts should not and cannot intervene in matters
dealing with the day-to-day operations of schools, courts should step in when basic constitutional rights
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those who are closest to the individuals affected by the decisions. Local
decision makers are more aware of the community and can use that
knowledge in a way that best represents local values and capabilities.
Courts, especially federal courts, are greatly removed from local
controversies. They lack familiarity with each individual circumstance
and the need for local government to enact certain rules and regulations.
While the court itself might not think that a local government is making
a wise or informed decision, the court would, in essence, strip the local
government from its decision-making capacity by imposing its wisdom
on the local community.
It can also be argued that a court imposing its will over a local
community is an improper use of judicial authority and is a violation of
separation of powers. However, this rule is not absolute. In situations
such as the one in Griswold, where constitutional rights are limited by
the local government, it is important that students have the opportunity
to ensure that their rights are protected. This is one of the essential
functions of the judiciary—ensuring that all people are afforded a day in
court so that they are not forced to bow to the whim of a local
government. While replacing local authority with the rule of the courts
may be troubling to our society, it is also troubling for a group of people
not to have a remedy for an infringement of their rights.
However, it is important for the judiciary to display caution before
intervening in school curriculum cases. Should the school ban materials
featuring graphic sex, violence, or obscenity, the judiciary would need
to leave that decision to the judgment of the school board. In the limited
situation where students are restricted access to information because a
school board buckled to political pressure, the judiciary needs to
intervene.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Massachusetts Board of Education to eliminate
contra-genocide materials from its school guide because of political
pressure from community members violated First Amendment rights of
students. By placing a greater weight on the rights of students to access
are implicated by school actions. Id.
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and receive information, the First Circuit Court of Appeals should have
reached a different conclusion to keep the First Amendment rights of
students intact that is more in line with other circuit courts. While the
Supreme Court and sister circuits have allowed schools to modify their
curriculums to further a compelling governmental interest, these courts
have never viewed political pressure as a compelling interest. A
decision for the students would have allowed them to be exposed to
different, unpopular ideas. While a decision for the students would have
resulted in a judicially-mandated curricular guide, that harm is not
nearly as great as the harm done by infringing on the students’ First
Amendment rights. Most importantly, for students to become better
prepared to face the real world, a decision for the students would have
compelled schools to teach children the skills needed to become
informed, independent thinkers.
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